In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure fuse_do_setattr() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate (fault_blocked = true) and releases it at the out:/error: labels. But when a writeback flush is also needed, a write_inode_now() failure returns directly and leaks the lock, so any later fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale rwsem. For example, truncate(2) on a setuid file reaches fuse_do_setattr() with both ATTR_SIZE and ATTR_MODE set: truncate(2) └─ do_truncate() ├─ dentry_needs_remove_privs() # S_ISUID └─ notify_change() # KILL_SUID -> ATTR_MODE └─ fuse_setattr() # no killpriv: │ # ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE └─ fuse_do_setattr() ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # IS_DAX && is_truncate └─ write_inode_now() # is_wb && ATTR_MODE └─ if (err) # e.g. daemon -> -EIO return err # <- lock leaked Fix this by adding an unlock label that releases the lock before returning the error, and use it for the fuse_dax_break_layouts() failure path as well.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure fuse_open() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate (dax_truncate = true) and releases it before the out_inode_unlock label. But when fuse_dax_break_layouts() fails, the goto out_inode_unlock skips the unlock and leaks the rwsem, so any later fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale lock. fuse_dax_break_layouts() can fail with -ERESTARTSYS when a signal interrupts the wait for busy DAX pages to drain: open("file", O_RDWR | O_TRUNC) └─ fuse_open() ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # dax_truncate └─ fuse_dax_break_layouts() └─ dax_break_layout() └─ wait_page_idle() # TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE └─ fuse_wait_dax_page() # unlock, schedule, re-lock └─ signal → -ERESTARTSYS goto out_inode_unlock # <- lock leaked Fix this by moving filemap_invalidate_unlock() below the label so that all error paths release the lock, and rename the label to out_unlock as it now covers more than just the inode lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_tcm: keep port count until LUN teardown completes tcm_usbg_drop_nexus() permits session removal once tpg_port_count reaches zero. However, usbg_port_unlink() currently decrements that count from the fabric_pre_unlink() callback, before core_dev_del_lun() waits for active se_lun references to drain. If removal of the last LUN races a nexus removal, the latter can observe a zero port count and call target_remove_session(). This frees sess_cmd_map while an in-flight struct usbg_cmd, including its work item, can still be accessed. Overlapping the last-LUN unlink with nexus removal reproduces this lifetime violation as a DEBUG_OBJECTS "free active" warning for usbg_cmd_work, followed by a target-core BUG/Oops. The generic target-core unlink path has no callback after core_dev_del_lun() completes. Add an optional fabric_post_unlink() callback and use it for the f_tcm port count. The count now remains nonzero until core_dev_del_lun() has finished draining active LUN references, preventing nexus removal from freeing the session during command completion.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Allocate full pages for {DE,EN}CRYPT ops on SNP-enabled hosts When {de,en}crypting memory of an SEV or SEV-ES guest on an SNP-enabled host via a temporary buffer, allocate a full 4KiB page for the buffer to ensure the page containing the buffer is wholly owned by KVM, i.e. won't be concurrently allocated and accessed by other kernel code while KVM is using the buffer to {de,en}crypt memory. On SNP-enabled platforms, when sending SEV/SEV-ES commands that trigger firmware writes to memory, the to-be-written page(s) must be (temporarily) assigned to Firmware (as required by the SNP architecture, to guard against using such commands as gadgets to attack SNP guests). See snp_map_cmd_buf_desc() and friends. Unfortunately, transferring ownership of a page to Firmware makes the page inaccessible to software, and thus writes generate RMP #PF violations. If KVM uses a sub-page allocation for its temporary buffer, some other actor in the kernel can allocate and use the other portions of the page, and thus trigger unexpected (and seemingly spurious) RMP #PF violations due to software attempting to access a Firmware-owned page. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff906ae30f0300 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x80000003) - RMP violation PGD 6b1b80d067 P4D 6b1b80d067 PUD 100231e2063 PMD 10055a88063 PTE 80000100630f0163 SEV-SNP: PFN 0x100630f0 unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x10063000 - 0x10063200] Oops: Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP CPU: 70 UID: 0 PID: 10658 Comm: svw_WaiterThrea Tainted: G U W O 7.1.0-smp--c22293789940-seanjc-next #1 PREEMPTLAZY Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026 RIP: 0010:memset+0xf/0x20 Call Trace: <TASK> __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x2a4/0x710 do_getxattr+0x4e/0x130 path_getxattrat+0x125/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f3a22cb6daa </TASK> Modules linked in: kvm_amd kvm irqbypass vfat fat ccp k10temp sha3 libsha3 i2c_piix4 gq(O) cdc_acm xhci_pci xhci_hcd gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03 CR2: ffff906ae30f0300 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:memset+0xf/0x20 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: 0x39e00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x02

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: device: fix out-of-bounds write in tls_append_frag() Found with syzkaller and a local syzbot instance running on top of a netdevsim TLS offload emulation; tls_device.c is otherwise only reachable on a machine with a NIC that implements the offload. tls_push_data() only checks whether the open record still has room for another frag at the bottom of its loop, and the MSG_MORE early break skips that check. The record survives to the next syscall with the frag count it already had, and tls_append_frag() does not check either, so with TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY_RO every splice(SPLICE_F_MORE) of a byte or two adds a non-coalescing pipe page and num_frags walks off the end of tls_record_info.frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS]. Once the record is pushed, tls_push_record() runs the same index over sg_tx_data[MAX_SKB_FRAGS] and the sg_set_page() writes land on the destruct_work that follows it, which the workqueue then calls. The byte limit is fine because copy drops to 0 and the loop falls through to the same check; the frag count has no such feedback. Push the record rather than keep a full one open, which is what a plain TCP socket does - tcp_sendmsg_locked() uses tcp_mark_push() and new_segment in both the copy and the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES paths, and tls_sw already sets full_record when the sk_msg ring fills up, MSG_MORE or not. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in tls_append_frag ( net/tls/tls_device.c:269) Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881104d1530 by task tls_oob/450 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 450 Comm: tls_oob Not tainted 7.2.0-rc7+ #329 PREEMPT Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) tls_append_frag (net/tls/tls_device.c:269) tls_push_data (net/tls/tls_device.c:518) tls_device_sendmsg (net/tls/tls_device.c:583) inet_sendmsg (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:865) sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:775 net/socket.c:790 net/socket.c:813) splice_to_socket (fs/splice.c:884) do_splice (fs/splice.c:936 fs/splice.c:1349) __do_splice (fs/splice.c:1431) __x64_sys_splice (fs/splice.c:1634 fs/splice.c:1616) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) </TASK> and, once the record is pushed: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:300:24 index 18 is out of range for type 'skb_frag_t [17]' UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:301:41 index 18 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]' UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:302:39 index 18 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]' UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/tls/tls_device.c:307:38 index 26 is out of range for type 'scatterlist [17]' kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea000411a680 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation Oops: Oops: 0011 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI Workqueue: ktls_device_destruct 0xffffea000411a680 RIP: 0010:0xffffea000411a680 Call Trace: <TASK> worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3405 kernel/workqueue.c:3486) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) </TASK>

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gtp: serialize PDP context updates PDP contexts can be deleted through GTP_CMD_DELPDP or while the GTP network device is being unregistered. The latter is serialized by RTNL, but the generic-netlink delete path only holds RCU. Running both paths concurrently can therefore make both paths delete the same PDP context. The issue was found through static analysis and reproduced on a KASAN-enabled kernel by a simple two-thread program racing GTP_CMD_DELPDP against RTM_DELLINK: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000120-0xdead000000000127] RIP: gtp_genl_del_pdp+0x1c1/0x420 [gtp] RBP: dead000000000122 The second deletion dereferenced the poisoned hlist pprev pointer. Serialize gtp_pdp_add(), gtp_genl_del_pdp(), and gtp_dellink() with a shared mutex. Keep the mutex held until the final use of a PDP context in the NEWPDP path, and keep the RCU read-side section around the complete PDP context use in the DELPDP path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: fix AO info use-after-free in tcp_ao_connect_init() tcp_v4_connect() adds a SYN-SENT socket to the ehash before calling tcp_connect(). If TCP-AO is configured, tcp_connect() first verifies that a key matches the peer and the bound device's current L3 master. tcp_ao_connect_init() later resolves the L3 master again and removes keys which do not match it. The socket lock does not stabilize the bound device's VRF membership. Detaching the device from its VRF between the initial validation and the L3-master calculation in tcp_ao_connect_init() can therefore make the validation succeed while initialization observes the default L3 domain and removes the only key. The subsequent AO lookup then fails, so the no-key path clears tp->ao_info and frees it directly. The receive path can find the socket in the ehash and load tp->ao_info under RCU before acquiring the socket lock. A reader which loaded the old pointer can thus continue into tcp_inbound_ao_hash() after the direct free. The issue was found during a static audit of TCP-AO object lifetime. An unprivileged reproducer in self-created user and network namespaces raced connect() with detaching a veth from its VRF while sending TCP-AO segments. It triggered the same KASAN report on two fresh boots: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tcp_inbound_ao_hash+0x585/0x19f0 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800bf88128 by task tcp_ao_vrf_race/232 Call Trace: tcp_inbound_ao_hash+0x585/0x19f0 tcp_inbound_hash+0x677/0xa80 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1c3e/0x3ab0 Allocated by task 235: tcp_ao_alloc_info+0x43/0xf0 tcp_ao_add_cmd+0xdf7/0x13b0 do_tcp_setsockopt+0x168c/0x2640 Freed by task 235: kfree+0x1b8/0x550 tcp_connect+0x252/0x4f00 tcp_v4_connect+0x1114/0x1720 The bad address is 40 bytes inside the freed 128-byte object, matching the tcp_ao_info counters.key_not_found field. The two runs used 1000 attempts each, reached the no-key path 366 and 411 times, and produced one and two KASAN reports respectively. With this change, the same reproducer reached the no-key path 366 times in 1000 attempts without a KASAN report or oops. Use tcp_ao_destroy_sock() for the no-key path. It unpublishes the AO info, updates the socket memory and static-key accounting, and defers the free until after an RCU grace period. Also drop the WARN_ON_ONCE() and its stale comment. The VRF detach race makes the no-key state reachable during normal operation, so it is a handled condition rather than an impossible assertion. On panic_on_warn kernels the WARN would turn this handled race into a kernel panic.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of current_key on reconnect to another peer tcp_inbound_ao_hash() is called before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken, with only rcu_read_lock() held. On the fast path for established sockets, if the rnext_keyid sent by the peer differs from current_key->sndid, the key the peer asked for is looked up and stored in current_key. The lookup is inside the RCU read side, but current_key outlives it. When the socket is disconnected and connect() is called again for another peer, tcp_ao_connect_init() unlinks every key that does not match the new peer and frees it with call_rcu(). If current_key points at such a key, it is cleared to NULL. The fast path reads sk_state only once on entry, so a softirq that got into it while the socket was still established can update current_key after that loop has already run. The update is inside the RCU read side, so it comes before the call_rcu() callback, and once the callback frees the key, current_key is left pointing at freed memory. The next transmission picks that pointer up in tcp_get_current_key(). tcp_ao_transmit_skb() then reads the traffic key from the freed object, which is the use-after-free. Wait for one grace period before unlinking, and only if a key is going to be removed. By the time tcp_connect() runs the socket is already in TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_AO_ESTABLISHED does not contain TCPF_SYN_SENT, so a softirq entering after the wait cannot reach the fast path, and the ones already in it have finished. The existing NULL handling in the loop is then enough.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close ZDI reported and analyzed a race condition during close for espintcp sockets: espintcp_close() frees emsg->skb via kfree_skb() without holding any socket lock. Concurrently, the xfrm_trans_reinject work queue invokes esp_output_tcp_finish() -> espintcp_push_skb() -> espintcp_push_msgs() -> skb_send_sock_locked(), which reads the same skb as a data source. Fix this by adding a synchronize_rcu() call after resetting sk_prot, since esp_output_tcp_finish() runs under RCU and won't use a socket with sk_prot == &tcp_prot. Simply taking the socket lock in espintcp_close() could lead to leaks, if esp_output_tcp_finish() re-adds an skb in the slot we just freed. After this, the existing barrier() is no longer needed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: clamp route advmss to TCP_MIN_MSS tcp_select_initial_window() assumes that callers never pass an MSS smaller than 1, but route-derived advmss values can violate that assumption. A too-small explicit RTAX_ADVMSS is one way to get there, but it is not the only one. The same divide-by-zero can also be reached through the "default advmss" path when RTAX_ADVMSS is left at 0 and the effective advmss is later driven down by route MTU and min_adv_mss. Introduce a tcp_dst_advmss() helper that clamps route advmss to TCP_MIN_MSS before TCP consumes it, and use it in the TCP paths that derive advmss from dst metrics. This keeps the effective MSS from dropping to zero before tcp_select_initial_window() rounds the receive window.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device ESP-in-TCP receives records through the TCP strparser. handle_esp() restores skb->dev from the saved skb_iif before passing the packet into the XFRM input path. Queued TCP data can be processed after the original ingress device has been removed, for example during veth or net namespace teardown. In that case dev_get_by_index_rcu() returns NULL. The XFRM IPv4 and IPv6 input paths both expect skb->dev to be valid while building the route lookup, so queued ESP-in-TCP data can dereference a NULL device. Drop the packet if the saved ingress device can no longer be resolved. Such a packet can no longer be routed through the normal XFRM receive path, and this preserves the existing behaviour for packets whose ingress device still exists.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work nat_keepalive_work() walks the state table while xfrm_state_walk() holds net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock. Its callback then acquires x->lock, which conflicts with the delete path taking the same locks in reverse order via xfrm_state_delete() and __xfrm_state_delete(). This creates an AB-BA deadlock that is reported by lockdep when a NAT keepalive worker races with SA deletion. Fix this by splitting the keepalive walk into two phases. First, collect the candidate states while the walk holds xfrm_state_lock and take a reference on each state. Then, after the walk completes, process each collected state and acquire x->lock without nesting it under xfrm_state_lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left AH6 rearranges routing-header addresses before computing or verifying the ICV. ipv6_rearrange_rthdr() assumes that segments_left is not larger than the number of addresses described by the routing header's hdrlen field. That assumption does not hold for raw IPv6 HDRINCL packets. A packet with hdrlen equal to 2 describes one address, but can carry an arbitrary segments_left value. With segments_left equal to 255, the function moves its address pointer 4,064 bytes backwards and passes a 4,064-byte length to memmove(), resulting in an out-of-bounds access. Validate the invariant locally before modifying the routing header or performing any address-pointer arithmetic, and propagate malformed-header errors to the existing AH6 input and output error paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes). xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown only frees the replacement pointer. Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that state from x->props.aalgo.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLAN's multicast context br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan() clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under br->multicast_lock before stopping a VLAN's multicast context. That is the teardown handshake: lockless readers gate on the flag through br_multicast_ctx_should_use() -> br_multicast_ctx_vlan_disabled(), so once it is cleared under the lock no reader can arm the context again. For a master VLAN the handshake never runs. __vlan_del() clears BRIDGE_VLAN_INFO_BRENTRY before calling br_vlan_put_master(), so br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan(masterv, false) returns early on !br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan): the flag stays set and br->multicast_lock is never taken. br_vlan_put_master() then drains the context in br_multicast_ctx_deinit() and frees the VLAN through call_rcu(), while a reader still inside rcu_read_lock() sees the context as enabled and re-arms it. The port and port-VLAN branch of the function has no br_vlan_is_brentry() test and flips the flag under br->multicast_lock, so it is not affected. The reader is the bridge transmit path. For a master VLAN br_multicast_rcv() selects brmctx = &vlan->br_mcast_ctx with pmctx = NULL, so IGMP sent to the bridge device re-arms the context's timers after br_multicast_ctx_deinit() has already stopped them. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0x412/0x4a0 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88810ac39918 by task brmc/601 __mod_timer+0x51a/0xc50 br_multicast_host_join+0x25b/0x390 __br_multicast_add_group+0x468/0x530 br_ip4_multicast_add_group+0x1a0/0x260 br_multicast_rcv+0x2cda/0x61e0 br_dev_xmit+0x6c4/0x1540 Allocated by task 610: br_vlan_add+0x111/0xb40 br_vlan_info+0x370/0x3e0 Freed by task 0: kfree+0x1a7/0x4f0 rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0 Only test br_vlan_is_brentry() when enabling, like the br_multicast_ctx_vlan_global_disabled() test next to it. Disabling then always clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under br->multicast_lock before br_multicast_ctx_deinit() drains the context.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/packet: defer vmalloc TX_RING free until skbs finish AF_PACKET TX_RING skbs keep a raw pointer to their ring frame. The skb page references preserve page-backed ring blocks after pg_vec is freed, but they do not preserve a vmalloc mapping. tpacket_destruct_skb() currently drops the pending reference before writing the timestamp and TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE to the frame. Move the decrement after those stores. The smp_wmb() in __packet_set_status() orders the frame stores before the decrement. Also recheck pending TX frames under pg_vec_lock before non-closing ring replacement, so a racing send cannot add a pending skb between the initial check and the ring swap. Ring allocation can produce a mixture of page-backed and vmalloc-backed blocks. Allocate deferred-work storage during TX ring setup when the first vmalloc-backed block is encountered, and keep its pointer in the pg_vec allocation header. If allocation fails, return -ENOMEM from ring setup. On socket close, a non-NULL pointer identifies a vmalloc-backed vector without a scan. If TX skbs remain, defer the whole vector to system_long_wq. After pg_vec is detached, a late destructor can skip the pending decrement. Use socket write-memory accounting as the deferred lifetime gate instead: an skb remains charged through its final sock_wfree(), after all ring-frame accesses. The delayed work retains a socket reference and reschedules itself until no TX skbs remain. Move pending_refcnt release to packet_sock_destruct() so late skb destructors and deferred cleanup can safely use it after packet_release(). Page-backed teardown remains synchronous, and no lock is added to the TX completion hot path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation End.DX4 and End.DT4 decapsulate an IPv4 packet through decap_and_validate() and send it directly to IPv4 routing. The inner packet therefore bypasses ip_rcv_core(), which normally clears IPCB before IPv4 interprets skb->cb. The skb instead retains IP6CB data from the outer packet. IP6CB and IPCB use the same skb->cb storage, so IP6CB(skb)->lastopt overlaps IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen and srr, while IP6CB(skb)->nhoff overlaps rr and ts. The sender can make the stale optlen byte nonzero with a valid outer extension-header chain. The reproducers put an eight-byte Destination Options header immediately after the 40-byte IPv6 header and before the Segment Routing Header. ipv6_destopt_rcv() records the sender-controlled Destination Options offset in both lastopt and nhoff, setting them to 40. On the reproduced little-endian x86-64 kernel, IPv4 therefore sees optlen = 40 and rr = 40. Both tcp_v4_save_options() and __ip_options_echo() skip option copying when optlen is zero. Here optlen is 40, so the TCP SYN path allocates room for 40 bytes of option data and calls __ip_options_echo(). The stale rr value makes that function read inner packet byte 41 as the Record Route option length. The reproducers set that sender-controlled byte to 255, so __ip_options_echo() copies 255 bytes into the 40-byte option-data area. Separate End.DX4 and End.DT4 reproducers on the unpatched v7.2-rc5 kernel both produced: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __ip_options_echo() Write of size 255 The relevant End.DX4 call path is: __ip_options_echo tcp_v4_route_req tcp_conn_request tcp_v4_conn_request tcp_rcv_state_process tcp_v4_do_rcv tcp_v4_rcv ip_protocol_deliver_rcu ip_local_deliver_finish ip_local_deliver input_action_end_dx4_finish input_action_end_dx4 The relevant End.DT4 call path is: __ip_options_echo tcp_v4_route_req tcp_conn_request tcp_v4_conn_request tcp_rcv_state_process tcp_v4_do_rcv tcp_v4_rcv ip_protocol_deliver_rcu ip_local_deliver_finish ip_local_deliver input_action_end_dt4 tcp_v4_save_options() is inlined into the tcp_v4_route_req() path, so it does not appear as a separate frame. When decap_and_validate() handles IPPROTO_IPIP, save the ingress interface from IP6CB, clear IPCB, and restore the saved value. Doing this in the common decapsulation path covers End.DX4, End.DT4, and End.DT46's IPv4 arm. Use IP6CB(skb)->iif rather than skb->skb_iif. These actions run after l3mdev processing, which can replace skb_iif with the L3 master; IP6CB iif still records the receiving interface set at IPv6 ingress.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: reject unrepresentable multicast TVLV offsets The network and transport header fields in struct sk_buff are 16-bit offsets from skb->head, and U16_MAX is reserved as the unset transport header value. batadv_tvlv_call_handler() sets both fields from a received multicast TVLV without checking whether the TVLV end is representable. If the end offset exceeds the field's range, skb_set_transport_header() truncates it so that the transport header precedes the network header. The negative difference is then returned by skb_network_header_len() as a large u32. batadv_mcast_forw_packet() consequently accepts an oversized multicast tracker and accesses memory beyond the skb data. Add skb_set_transport_header_careful(), an offset-aware counterpart to skb_reset_transport_header_careful(), which validates the final head-relative offset before assigning it. Use the new helper in batadv_tvlv_call_handler() and reject unrepresentable TVLVs before setting the network header.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: keep the last remote linked during FDB flush A non-nexthop FDB entry is expected to have at least one remote while it remains reachable through the FDB hash table. A filtered bulk flush violates this invariant when every remote matches: It unlinks the last remote in vxlan_fdb_dst_destroy() and only afterwards tells vxlan_flush() to destroy the parent FDB entry. An RCU reader can find the parent during this interval. first_remote_rcu() then applies list_entry_rcu() to the empty list head, producing an invalid remote pointer that the receive learning path can read from and write to. When a matching remote is the sole remaining remote, leave it linked and ask the caller to destroy the entire FDB entry. vxlan_fdb_destroy() keeps the remote attached while sending the deletion notification and removing the parent from the lookup structures.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: don't queue packet path object notifications All file:line references below are against v7.2-rc4 (ac5b0e5651b1). The trace was captured on 7.2.0-rc6-kasan72rc6 (075b74841bd0), where the same lines apply. nft_obj_notify() is exported and reached from the packet path. Its only in-tree caller is nft_quota_obj_eval() (net/netfilter/nft_quota.c:68), which notifies with GFP_ATOMIC while evaluating a rule for a transiting packet, holding no mutex. Since commit 67cc570edaa0 ("netfilter: nf_tables: coalesce multiple notifications into one skbuff") that notification is no longer sent immediately. __nft_obj_notify() queues it onto nft_net->notify_list via nft_notify_enqueue() (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1211), which is a bare list_add_tail(). notify_list has no lock of its own (include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h:1951), it is serialised by commit_mutex: the six other enqueue sites all run inside a netlink transaction, and the drain in nft_commit_notify() (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:10746) does list_del() + kfree_skb() from nf_tables_commit() with commit_mutex held. Sending packets through a chain that references a depleted quota object therefore races an unlocked list_add_tail() against list_del() + kfree_skb() on another CPU. The WRITE_ONCE(prev->next, new) in __list_add() then stores through an sk_buff that has already been freed: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __nft_obj_notify+0x2c5/0x2d0 Write of size 8 at addr ff110001047183c0 by task poc/76 CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 76 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 7.2.0-rc6-kasan72rc6 #4 Call Trace: <IRQ> __nft_obj_notify (include/linux/list.h:164 include/linux/list.h:191 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1211 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8743) nft_quota_obj_eval (net/netfilter/nft_quota.c:68) nft_do_chain_inet nf_hook_slow __ip_local_out ip_push_pending_frames udp_send_skb udp_sendmsg __x64_sys_sendto Allocated by task 77: __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:704) __nft_obj_notify (include/net/netlink.h:1055 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8731) nft_quota_obj_eval (net/netfilter/nft_quota.c:68) nft_do_chain Freed by task 79: nf_tables_commit (include/linux/skbuff.h:1332 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:10759 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:11185) nfnetlink_rcv_batch (net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:574) netlink_unicast netlink_sendmsg The buggy address belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232 Queueing from the packet path is wrong even leaving the race aside: notify_list is only drained by nft_commit_notify() from nf_tables_commit() (:11185), so a notification enqueued outside a transaction is not sent until some later netlink batch commits, if one ever does. The gfp argument that nft_obj_notify() still takes is a leftover of the pre-67cc570edaa0 behaviour, where this path called nfnetlink_send() directly. Restore that: split the message construction out into nft_obj_notify_alloc() and let each caller decide what to do with the skb. nft_obj_notify(), the exported one reached from the packet path, sends it straight away; nf_tables_obj_notify(), which runs under commit_mutex, keeps queueing it, so transaction notifications are still coalesced.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: virtio - bound the akcipher result length virtio_crypto_dataq_akcipher_callback() sets the result length from the device-reported response length without bounding it to the destination buffer, which was allocated for the original request length. sg_copy_from_buffer() then reads that many bytes from the destination buffer; a backend reporting a larger length over-reads adjacent kernel heap into the caller's scatterlist (an out-of-bounds read). Clamp the reported length to the originally requested destination length. A conforming device reports no more than that, so valid results are unaffected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qcom-rng - Remove crypto_rng interface qcom-rng.c exposes the same hardware through two completely separate interfaces, crypto_rng and hwrng. However, the implementation of this is buggy because it permits generation operations from these interfaces to run concurrently with each other, accessing the same registers. That is, qcom_rng_generate() synchronizes with itself but not with qcom_hwrng_read(). This results in potential repetition of output from the RNG, output of non-random values, etc. Fortunately, there's actually no point in hardware RNG drivers implementing the crypto_rng interface. It's not actually used by anything besides the "rng" algorithm type of AF_ALG, which in turn is not actually used in practice. Other crypto_rng hardware drivers are likewise being phased out, leaving just the hwrng support. Thus, remove it to simplify the code and avoid conflict (and confusion) with the hwrng interface which is the one that actually matters.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: sun8i-ce - Remove crypto_rng interface Since the crypto_rng interface for hardware PRNGs is unused and is redundant with hwrng and the actual Linux RNG, it's being phased out. Most drivers for it were already removed. Go ahead and remove the sun8i-ce support which is one of the only remaining ones. Note that the sun8i-ce support for hwrng remains in place. That is the interface that actually matters. As usual for crypto_rng, this driver was also buggy: its ->generate() function had a use-after-free vulnerability due to using wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() without handling shutting down the DMA operation if a signal is sent. There's no point in fixing this separately only to remove the code anyway, so this commit is marked with Fixes and Cc stable.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: sun8i-ss - Remove crypto_rng interface Since the crypto_rng interface for hardware PRNGs is unused and is redundant with hwrng and the actual Linux RNG, it's being phased out. Most drivers for it were already removed. Go ahead and remove the sun8i-ss support which is one of the only remaining ones. As usual for crypto_rng, this driver was also buggy: its ->generate() function had a use-after-free vulnerability due to using wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() without handling shutting down the DMA operation if a signal is sent. Also, it had a buffer overread bug in the line 'memcpy(ctx->seed, d + dlen, ctx->slen);'. There's no point in fixing these bugs separately only to remove the code anyway, so this commit is marked with Fixes and Cc stable.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation The AAD buffer allocated in qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen() can be smaller than the length later programmed into the DMA scatterlist. The allocation size is currently calculated as: ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN while the DMA length is set to: ALIGN(assoclen + adata_header_len, 16) Since ALIGN() does not distribute over addition, the allocation can be smaller than the DMA length. For example, when assoclen = 32 and adata_header_len = 2: allocation = ALIGN(32, 16) + 6 = 38 DMA length = ALIGN(32 + 2, 16) = 48 As a result, the QCE hardware can read beyond the allocated buffer while computing the CBC-MAC over the associated data. The extra bytes are folded into the authentication tag, resulting in an incorrect tag and causing CCM self-test failures such as: alg: aead: ccm-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong result) on test vector 8 Fix the allocation by adding the maximum possible AAD header length before alignment: ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16) This guarantees that the allocated buffer is large enough for the fully padded AAD data for all supported header sizes.